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Gujarat State has implemented the “Chiranjeevi Yojana” to improve access to institutional 
delivery with an objective to reduce maternal mortality and at the same time providing 
financial protection to poor families.  The scheme involves private providers in provision of 
maternity services through contracting-out and use of voucher type of mechanism.  Five 
districts covered by this scheme have population of about 10.5 million of which 43 per cent 
are below poverty line having about 110,000 deliveries per annum.  The scheme during first 
year of its implementation has covered 31,641 deliveries. Of the total 217 providers in these 
districts 133 (61 per cent) have been empanelled in this scheme.   
 
This paper mainly examines two things, one, the revenue distribution a private provider 
would have experienced if the provider was not part of the Chiranjeevi Scheme and second, 
does the financial package provided in the scheme provides adequate incentives to the 
private provider to join the scheme.  Further, given the number of providers empanelled in 
each district, does number of providers contracted-out in the scheme make any difference in 
revenue distribution of private provider?  We use Monte Carlo simulation method to examine 
these issues.   
 
The simulation results suggest that the average revenue is Rs. 1416 per delivery.  This is less 
than what the provider is being reimbursed by the government on capitation fee basis, which 
is Rs. 1445 (Rs. 1795 less Rs. 350 towards reimbursement for food, transport and Dai).  By 
joining this scheme, the provider’s additional margin on an average is 2 per cent.  This is over 
and above the profits included in the average revenue earned if the provider was not part of 
the scheme.  The results further suggest that revenue distribution is scattered asymmetrically 
indicating significant risk in revenues to the provider.   By joining in the Chiranjeevi Scheme, 
the provider is able to reduce the overall risk in revenue.  In addition to this, the increased 
volume of services will spread the fixed cost of the provider and increase overall profitability 
further.  Since the provider is paid up-front advance for delivering services under the 
scheme, there is no transaction cost of bureaucratic delays in payments.  The provider in the 
absence of this scheme can maximise the revenue by doing more cesarean cases.  The 
scheme has embedded incentive to minimise the cesarian cases to maximise the revenue and 
this produces larger indirect benefits from health systems point of view.  The study identifies 
other issues that need further investigation. 
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I.  Introduction 
The Gujarat State has implemented a health care scheme called the “Chiranjeevi Yojana” to 
improve access to institutional delivery with an objective to reduce maternal mortality and at 
the same time provide financial protection to poor families in Gujarat.  The scheme covers 
‘below poverty line’ (BPL) families who are generally under-represented, have limited access 
to institutional facilities and may experience economic and social hardships due to 
complications during delivery.  The scheme aims at involving private providers in the 
provision of maternity services through contracting-out and use of voucher type of 
mechanism.   
The success of such public-private partnerships critically hinge on financial and other 
incentives embedded in the scheme.  The financial package of this scheme is pre-determined 
and is based on several assumptions made at the time of designing its financial package.  The 
two key assumptions in this scheme relate to the probability of delivery status (i.e., the 
probability of occurrence of normal, cesarean and complicated cases) and the charges 
reimbursed for providing services.  These assumptions are expected to have significant 
implications for the long-term continuity and sustainability of the scheme.    The departure 
from assumed probabilities about delivery status, the distribution of cases among providers 
and the actual cost experience would affect the private provider incentives.  The objective of 
this paper is to evaluate these assumptions using simulation and understand the implications 
of these assumptions from an implementation and a policy point of view.   
 
The paper examines the following issues. The scheme contracts out each private provider for 
100 deliveries.  Given the utilisation of institutional facilities for deliveries and probability of 
delivery status (normal, cesarean and other complications), what are the characteristics of 
revenue distribution that a private provider would have experienced if the provider had not 
joined the Chiranjeevi Scheme and how does it compare with the financial package provided 
in the scheme? 
 
Further, the number of providers contracted out may have implications for the distribution 
of cases across providers.  Given the population of the district and number of deliveries that 
are likely to occur, does the number of providers in the scheme make any difference in 
revenue distribution of private providers?  We use a Monte Carlo Simulation methodology to 
examine these questions.   
 
The paper is divided into nine sections.  The second section discusses the context of the 
scheme.  Section three discusses the Chiranjeevi Yojana.  Subsequent sections discuss the 
financial package of contracted services, implementation of the scheme and key challenges.  
Based on key policy challenges, we report the simulation results.  Finally, we discuss the 
implications of the results. 
II.  Context  
High maternal mortality continues to be one of the major health challenges in emerging 
economies like India. Nearly 65 per cent of the estimated 30 million deliveries in India occur 
at home.  The access to appropriately equipped health care facilities is a major issue. As a 
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100,000 live births. Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) is 63 per 1000 live births. Further, 73.3 per 
cent of the infant deaths occur in their neo-natal period (within 28 days of birth).   
Haemorrhage, sepsis, obstructed labour, toxaemia, anemia and unsafe abortions are the 
major causes of maternal deaths. For this and other reasons, India adds a whopping 25.7 per 
cent to the burden of maternal deaths in the world. Most of these maternal deaths in India 
could be prevented by timely availability of healthcare facilities to women. 
 
India is committed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the vision set for 
2010 is to: 
 
·  reduce MMR from 389 (in 1998) to 100 per 100,000 live births by 2010, 
·  reduce IMR from 60 to 30 by 2010, and 
·  stabilise population by reducing total fertility rate (TFR) from 3.0 to 2.1 by 2010. 
 
Addressing the maternal health and reduction in child mortality has a direct bearing on 
various other MDGs.  The overall population health and life expectancy are directly affected 
by the maternal and child health.  Non-availability of health services and lack of access to 
private providers may force the women in need to opt for home delivery, thereby increasing 
the chances of mortality.  In cases of emergency and complicated deliveries, for the families 
opting for private services, costs incurred in the utilization of these services may push the 
families into abject poverty and bring them below BPL status. Krishna (2005) finds that ill 
health and high healthcare expenses are among the most important reasons for falling into 
poverty.  For example, in Gujarat, 88 per cent of the responses indicated health related costs 
as the main reasons for falling into poverty.  This happens despite Gujarat state being a 
relatively richer and faster growing state in India.  People in villages and remote areas in 
many parts of India face a significantly greater threat of falling into poverty because of 
health-related reasons. This has implications for first MDG goal that is to eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger. 
Experiences elsewhere such as, in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu suggest that an increase in 
skilled birth attendants during delivery resulted in concurrent reduction in MMR.  Therefore, 
strategies to reduce maternal mortality in past have focused on increasing the availability of 
trained birth attendants.  However, it has also been observed that simply improving access to 
trained health attendant during delivery cannot ensure reduction in maternal mortality
1. This 
has to be backed up by the provision for emergency obstetric care (EmOC) facility to save 
the lives of women who develop complications during pregnancy and delivery.   
Reducing maternal mortality and promoting institutional deliveries is a multi-faceted task that 
involves improving the health service delivery, demand generation in the community, 
promoting community awareness and sensitisation about preventive measures, timely 
identification of early symptoms and referral. From a systems perspective, there is a need to 
strengthen the primary health centre (PHC) and EmOC facilities. A primary health care 
centre needs to be supported by secondary and tertiary level health services providing 
EmOC.  The public health delivery system, however, faces many challenges and experiences 
                                                 
1 Hay, M. Cameron. 1999. Dying Mothers: Maternal Mortality in Rural Indonesia. Medical Anthropology. Vol. 
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problems in addressing the needs of community in an effective manner.  The public health 
also faces challenge of inadequate funding and lack of accountability and responsiveness and 
incongruence between available funding and commitment.  These problems are manifested 
in non-availability of qualified staff in government health centre.  Non-availability of well-
equipped facilities becomes a critical constraint.  For example, in community health centres 
(CHCs) in Gujarat about 65 per cent of MD (Gynaecologist) positions are vacant.  This 
number is about 30 per cent for district hospitals.  In addition, there is serious shortage of 
Paediatricians (67 per cent vacancy) in the district hospitals
2 in Gujarat. Similarly, 
unavailability of anaesthetist and restrictive practices about anaesthesia in the country limits 
access
3.   
These and other factors pose problems of access to public health care facilities.  Most of the 
facilities are not having adequate health infrastructure and women may have to travel long 
distances to reach the nearest health facility.  The health-seeking behaviour also poses 
problems of acceptability of various components of reproductive and child health (RCH) 
intervention.  Attempts to address many of these issues have not produced satisfactory 
results.   
It has been observed that a large number of people utilise private sector services. Given the 
presence of private sector, it is imperative to include the private providers in the delivery of 
services to improve the access and thereby improve the institutional delivery rate.  Exploring 
public-private partnerships is one of the ways to address this problem.  Several options have 
evolved over time for fostering effective public-private partnerships. These relate to 
contracting-out health services to private partners, contracting-in services from private 
parties, joint venture, involvement of professional association, involvement of corporate 
sector, involvement of NGOs, social marketing, social franchising, voucher system, 
promoting grant-in-aid institutions etc.  To reduce maternal mortality, Gujarat has 
implemented a public-private partnership scheme in which private providers are involved 
through a financing mechanism to provide maternity health services. This scheme covers the 
BPL families by making their utilisation of private facility a cash-less event and covers direct 
and indirect out-of-pocket costs such as travel and cost of accompanying person.  
III.  The Chiranjeevi Yojana   
The government of Gujarat has developed a pilot intervention to explore the option of 
involving private providers in provision of maternity services.  The presence of private sector 
providers is quite significant in Gujarat.  The state has an estimated 17738 registered doctors 
of which 3/4
th are working in private health facilities
4. However, the cost for accessing care 
in private facilities deters the poor from seeking care during delivery.  One way of addressing 
financial barrier to care is through some effective health financing mechanism.   
                                                 
2 http://www.gujhealth.gov.in/job/rural_hlth.htm as accessed on 12 May 2006 
3 Mavalankar DV (2001). Policy Barriers Preventing Access to Emergency Obstetric Care in Rural India. W.P. 
No. 2001-11-02. November 2001. IIM Ahmedabad. 
4 Bhat Ramesh, Verma BB and Reuban E. (2001). An Empirical Analysis of District Hospitals and Grant-in-aid 
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The Government of Gujarat has initiated a scheme on pilot basis to increase the proportion 
of institutional delivery in five of the most vulnerable districts
5.  The districts covered in pilot 
study, record the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in Gujarat.  The scheme is 
known as the Chiranjeevi Yojana (meaning “eternal life scheme”).  This initiative involves the 
private practitioners in service delivery in remote areas of Gujarat.  The district health 
officials assume greater responsibility in implementing this scheme and facilitate the 
involvement of private providers.  By increasing the institutional delivery, the scheme aims to 
achieve safe delivery and lower infant mortality rates.   The Chiranjeevi Yojana intends to 
cover the BPL families in these districts.  The beneficiary has an advantage of referring to 
any empanelled private nursing home or private hospital; get the delivery done (normal, 
caesarean, or having other complications) without paying the charges.  The scheme is based 
on the concept of a voucher system and families having BPL card or having certificate by 
designated village leader can avail this facility.  The benefits package also includes free 
medicines after delivery and transport reimbursement to the family. The scheme also 
provides a monetary incentive to the attendant to compensate loss of days’ wages. The 
enrolled private doctors are given a fixed sum as a deposit in advance to conduct the 
deliveries and meet the expenses that covered by the scheme. 
IV.  Financial package for contracted-out services 
Under the Chiranjeevi Yojana, BPL mothers receive cash-less maternity services.  The 
government has contracted out services to private gynaecologists. The financial package of 
the scheme was prepared in consultation with SEWA rural Jhagadia and the Federation of 
Obstetric and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) members.  This information was 
used to arrive at a uniform rate that could be paid to private provider conducting any type of 
delivery (normal as well as complicated cases).  The financial package for the service 
providers was designed based on 100 deliveries of batch size.  A sum of Rs. 800 was 
estimated for normal deliveries and Rs. 5000 for a cesarean. These charges were based on 
market prevailing rates and given the probability of risk and normal cases; a single rate per 
delivery was worked out.   
The status of deliveries (probability of risk and normal cases) was arrived at keeping in mind 
the national average of complicated cases per 100 deliveries. For example, 15 per cent of the 
deliveries were considered as complicated cases. Out of this, 7 per cent includes cesarean 
cases and remaining 8 per cent includes blood transfusion, eclampsia and other complicated 
cases. Charges for pre-delivery consultation, sonography, transport and Dai were also 
included to arrive at the final sum of Rs. 179,500 per 100 deliveries irrespective of its nature. 
The details of these charges are provided in Table 1.  The total charges include the profit of 
private providers. An advance of Rs. 20,000 is given to the Gynaecologists to commence 
treatment.  Doctors are asked to maintain a separate file of the Chiranjeevi patients, 
reimburse Rs. 200 to the family to compensate for expenses incurred on transport and Rs. 50 
as an honorarium to the attendant. The names and addresses of the private hospital are given 
to the PHC and the female health workers (FHWs) for referrals and a complete record of 
each doctor’s performance is maintained at the district headquarters.  
                                                 
5 Bhat Ramesh, Amarjit Singh, Sunil Maheshwari and Somen Saha, “Maternal Health Financing – Issues and 
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V.  Implementation of the scheme 
The scheme was implemented in November 2005 in five districts of Gujarat.  These districts 
are Banaskantha, Dahod, Kutch, Panchmahal and Sabarkantha with a total population of 
about 10.5 million.  The implementation of the scheme focused on targeting of beneficiaries, 
increasing awareness and community involvement, empanelling service providers and 
monitoring of the scheme.  The Department of Health and Family Welfare (DoHFW) played 
key role in designing and developing this scheme. The district health officials hold the 
primary responsibility of managing the scheme.   
Five districts covered by this scheme have a population of about 10.5 million of which 43 per 
cent are below poverty line having about 110,000 deliveries per annum.  The scheme during 
the first year of its implementation has covered 31,641 deliveries covering 34 per cent of the 
BPL deliveries. 
Of the total 217 providers in these districts 133 (61 per cent) have been empanelled in this 
scheme.  The average number of deliveries carried out by these providers has been 238. Of 
the total deliveries, 4.7 per cent have been lower segment caesarean section (LSCS) deliveries 
and 87 per cent have been normal deliveries. 
The scheme shows that by providing financial protection through 100% subsidy of the 
delivery cost to BPL families through private providers has the potential to increase the 
institutional delivery rate and reduce the MMR and IMR substantially amongst the most 
vulnerable groups of the population.  This scheme has increased the access to institutional 
facilities for maternity care.  The cost of seeking delivery in private facilities by BPL families 
is high.  This scheme covers both direct and indirect cost (for example travel and cost of an 
accompanying person).  The financial burden in case of complications can be catastrophic 
for BPL families.    
The main objective of the scheme has been to reduce the maternal mortality by increasing 
the number of institutional deliveries and at the same time removing financial barriers of 
poor families in accessing these facilities.  Data suggests a steady increase in the number of 
deliveries in this scheme.  Institutional deliveries in a government setup have remained nearly 
static at a low level throughout the period with an average of 8 per cent of the total 
deliveries. Although it is too early to predict success or failure of any scheme, early trend in 
data suggested an increase in institutional delivery in private set up since the inception of the 
Chiranjeevi Yojana. 
VI.  Key challenges 
The Chiranjeevi Yojana implemented by the Government of Gujarat has the potential to 
improve the access to maternity care by contracting out the maternity services to private 
providers.  Responsibility for monitoring the scheme is also delegated to the district 
authority, with the block health officer directly responsible for scheme implementation and 
monitoring. There is an inbuilt mechanism to discourage unnecessary cesarean section 
deliveries and promote institutional deliveries. However, the experiences in implementing the 
scheme pose several challenges for policy makers and programme managers.  Most of the 
observations presented here are based on a focus group discussion of providers and 
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in developing the scheme.  For example, while developing the financial package for the 
Chiranjeevi Yojana, the total financial charges were fixed keeping in mind the national 
average of complicated cases per 100 deliveries. The payment package of Rs. 179,500 for 100 
deliveries was based on this assumption.  The feedback from providers suggest that the 
concept of the ‘100 delivery’ package is not quite clear to them.  They still measure their 
earnings based on a per delivery basis.  This is further complicated by the fact that there may 
be asymmetric distribution of risk cases across the districts and providers.  For example, it 
was reported that Dahod pilot district experiences an exceptionally high rate of cesarean 
section of 18 per cent of the total number of deliveries conducted in the district (see Table 
2).  The discussions with the provider also suggest that they have experienced larger number 
of risk cases than expected.   
The broad challenges in implementing this type of scheme depend on: 
·  the assumption about the delivery status (i.e., the probability of occurrence of normal, 
caesarean or other complications in 100 deliveries); 
·  the assumptions made in developing the financial package and characteristics of revenue 
earned if the provider does not join the scheme; 
·  the number of providers empanelled and their geographic distribution and its affect on 
the distribution of cases and revenue distribution of a provider; and 
·  The distribution of risk cases across the regions and providers. 
All these factors will affect the incentive structure of providers and therefore have 
implications for the long-term sustenance of this scheme.  This paper examines these issues 
and discusses how sensitive these risks are to the entire incentive structure of the scheme.   
Departure from distribution of risk cases across providers will create strong disincentives for 
providers and may lead to implementation problems of the scheme.  In the next section we 
describe a computer model that we developed to simulate the revenue performance of 
private providers who are not a part of the scheme and study whether the provider have 
incentive to join the Chiranjeevi Yojana. 
VII.  Simulation model 
We use Monte Carlo simulation method to explore the questions listed in the previous 
section. For this purpose, we prepared a detailed simulation model of the delivery system. In 
Figure 1, we provide the flow chart of the delivery status of an expectant mother and we use 
this as the basis for developing the simulation model using the software @Risk. The 
flowchart shows the process followed by an expectant mother for delivery at a service 
provider’s location. The simulation model specifies the following parameters: 
 
(a) Arrival rate: Arrival rate of expectant mother has been assumed to be 100 deliveries per 
provider.  This arrival pattern has been modelled as a Poisson process with inter-arrival time 
following exponential distribution. The mean inter-arrival time was set equal to total time 
period of one year divided by the total arrival cases of 100. 
 
(b) Services and probabilities:  The flow chart presented in Figure 1 describes the services 
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the expectant mother may go through a variety of investigation procedures (e.g., clinical 
investigation, sonography, blood test etc.) during her stay at the service unit.  Based on this, 
her delivery status (e.g., normal delivery, complicated delivery etc.) is determined.  For 
example, an expectant mother may come to an outpatient department (OPD) for clinical 
investigation. The diagnosis may suggest that there is still time for delivery and she may be 
advised to go back and come later.   Alternatively, she may be admitted to the hospital and 
kept under observation.  In case of any observable risk factor, the expectant mother would 
be suggested to go through a sonography test after which there is a chance that she may be 
referred a LSCS case.  Such eventuality may also happen during the labour process.  In case 
she is recommended for a normal delivery, she will undergo normal investigations like blood 
test, blood pressure etc.  However, there is a chance that during the delivery process the 
expectant mother may experience difficulties resulting into certain complications.  In such a 
situation depending on the risk factor, the provider may use forecep or a vacuum method of 
delivery or, depending on the risk assessment, the provider may decide to go for cesarean.   
 
Once the baby is delivered, post-delivery observation time and stay in hospital will depend 
on whether it was a normal delivery or a complicated case.  For example, in a normal delivery 
case both mother and the child will be kept under observation for sometime (generally, one 
to two hours).  After observation, if the condition of both mother and child is normal, then 
the mother along with the child is shifted to a ward. Normally, they are discharged from the 
ward after two days. If there is any problem with the child then the baby is sent to the NICU 
section. If there is any problem with the mother (e.g., requiring blood transfusion or 
eclampsia etc.), then she undergoes the required treatment. The computer simulation models 
the above situation, for instance.  
 
For these service flows, we use the probabilities as assumed in developing financial package 
of the scheme.  Probabilities for services such as sonography etc. have been arrived at based 
on discussion with providers.  Table 3 provides these probabilities.  We use these in 
simulating various scenarios.  For creating this probability matrix, we have assumed that 
arrival rate of delivery cases to a particular provider would be 100.  In the simulation model, 
we have included the total population of the district, the birth rate and number of providers 
to check whether each provider is going to get 100 cases assuming each provider having 
same chance of receiving the case.   
 
(c) Service rates:  The total number of cases that can be investigated at a particular service 
unit per unit of time (i.e., number of cases investigated divided by per unit of time say one 
hour) is defined as the service rate. For example, when an expectant mother reaches at a 
particular station say for her sonography, the time taken to complete the procedure is termed 
as the service time.  Therefore, if the average service rate of the sonography centre is four 
patients per hour then the average service time per patient will be 15 minutes.  Here the 
service time at any station may involve preparation of instrument, primary check up etc. 
Table 4 gives the service rates at various stations that a case might undergo during delivery 
process. These service times are based upon the data provided by a local hospital and 
available in the Chiranjeevi Yojana. In the simulation model, service times are assumed to 
follow exponential distribution.  
 
(d) Capacity of resources:  Each service provider would have a constraint on the number 
of cases they can admit to any service unit at any time.  This will be determined by the 
capacity of the service unit.  This can be defined as the number of cases investigated or 
served at a particular service unit at any specific instant of time. For example, the number of 
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handle.  In case the service unit is busy, the patient has to wait.   To capture this aspect, 
waiting place has been created in front of each station (shown in flow chart) to capture the 
average waiting time at each station in case services are not available at any specific point of 
time.  Since this study focuses on simulating the charges reimbursed to providers, we have 
assumed capacities at all the stations very high, so there is no capacity constraint and waiting 
times are zero.   We simulate the effect of the resource constraint and waiting time in a 
separate study. 
 
(e) Financial charges for providing services:  In the simulation model, when a particular 
delivery case undergoes a particular service unit, a financial charge is assigned to it for various 
services that are used.  The simulation model adds the total charges for various services.  The 
details of charges of various services are provided in Table 5.  These charges are based on the 
estimates worked out for developing the total payment package for the scheme.  There are 
service units such as initial consultation for which charges have not been provided as its cost 
is included in other service procedures and hence the charge of such services have been 
assumed to be equal to zero.  These charges define the revenue distribution of a provider. 
We model the above-mentioned maternal delivery process flow chart and the accompanying 
assumptions using the @Risk software. We perform Monte Carlo simulation and estimate the 
distribution of charges across each process and over all the cases.  The analysis is based on 
the assumption that the delivery status of expectant mother remains the same as per the 
probabilities indicated in Table 3.  We also assume that the underlying socio-economic-
demographic characteristics of the population remain constant and do not change.   
For simulating the experience of private providers in the Chiranjeevi Yojana, we approach 
the simulation in the following way.  Using @RISK we run the simulation model with 100 
iterations and 5000 simulations for Scenario 1, each time using a different random seed value 
(see Appendix 1).  Here 100 iterations denote 100 cases and these are simulated 5000 times, 
thus giving us a distribution of average charges that a private provider would experience.  
Based on the above, we report the simulation results for the following two scenarios:  
·  Scenario 1: Simulation of provider payment system is based on probabilities and 
financial charges assumed in the scheme. Here the assumption is that each service 
provider will be getting exactly 100 cases of delivery. 
·  Scenario 2:  In this scenario, the simulation is carried out for each district separately 
after considering the number of private providers in these districts. 
VIII.  Results 
This section presents the results of the simulation study.  To find out provider’s incentive to 
join the scheme we first find the revenue distribution of private providers in case they were 
not part of the scheme and compare it with the financial package available under the 
Chiranjeevi Yojana.  The results of the two scenarios discussed in the previous section are 
presented below. 
Scenario 1 
We run the first set of simulations based on the assumptions that all providers experience the 
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charges for various services. The revenue distribution of private provider based on 
simulation results is given in Figure 2.  While fitting the data resulting from 5000 simulations, 
the distribution fit is gamma distribution, with infinite limit on one side (see Table 7). 
The simulation results suggest that the average revenue (in terms of expenses incurred by the 
family on delivery) of the provider is Rs. 1416 per delivery. This is the revenue provider 
would have earned and if the provider is operating on its own and not a part of any scheme.  
This is less than what the provider would be reimbursed by the government on capitation 
fee, which is Rs. 1445 (Rs. 1795 less Rs. 350 towards reimbursement for food, transport and 
Dai).  Provider will earn extra average revenue of 2 per cent by joining the Chiranjeevi 
Yojana.  This is over and above the profits included in the average revenue the provider 
would have earned, if the provider was not part of the scheme.   
Simulation results presented above suggest that there is a “minimum” possible average 
revenue of Rs. 700 which the provider would earn which is substantially less than the 
reimbursement in the scheme.  However, there is no restriction on the maximum revenue 
possible because conceptually the maximum value of this distribution is infinity. Both these 
results have been generated by extrapolation of the simulation data values. However, the 
minimum average revenue that a provider can experience is Rs. 1089.  The actual maximum 
value of this distribution based on results is Rs. 1869 (shown in parentheses in the Table 7), 
and the probability that the revenue will exceed these values is almost zero. Since in the 
present setup, number of simulations is large, these values can be accepted as the minimum 
and maximum values that this distribution can take instead of infinity. 
The results also indicate that there is a probability of about 38 per cent that the revenue of a 
provider would exceed Rs. 1445, the reimbursement amount offered by the government if 
the provider is a part of the scheme.  Consequently, there is a 62 per cent chance that his 
revenue will be less than Rs. 1445.  So by not joining the scheme the provider is exposed to 
risk of earning lesser average revenue at higher percentage of time (62 per cent) than what is 
being reimbursed in scheme.  The simulations results also suggest that risk in revenues is not 
symmetrically distributed, as even in the distribution of revenue values less than Rs.1445, 16 
per cent are the chances that the revenue values will be between Rs.1399 (modal value) and 
Rs.1445 (government offered reimbursement amount).  Also mean revenue value is right 
most to the mode and median revenue values respectively.  This is verified by measures of 
skewness and kurtosis, which suggest that the distribution of revenue is scattered 
significantly.  The results indicate that there is more likelihood of revenues being on the 
higher side as revenues are concentrated more to the right of the modal value of Rs.1399. 
However, as mentioned earlier a significant 16 per cent is between modal value Rs.1399 and 
government offered value Rs.1445.  
Therefore, joining the Chiranjeevi Scheme helps the provider to reduce the overall risk in 
revenue.  These providers are in most vulnerable districts and reduction in overall revenue 
risk is an important incentive for them.  In addition to this, the increased volume will spread 
the fixed cost of the provider and increase overall profitability further.  We have not 
examined the issue of economies of scale issues in this paper. 
Given the complexities of healthcare, providers in an informational asymmetry setting have 
several options to maximise the revenue.  Most of these options may not be desirable from 
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can maximise the revenue by doing more cesarean cases.  The scheme has embedded 
incentive to minimise the caesarean cases and yet maximise the revenue.   
Scenario 2 
As discussed earlier, the number of providers contracted out may have implications for the 
distribution of cases across providers and it may affect the revenue distribution of providers.  
Under Scenario 2 we examine the question that given the population of the district and 
number of deliveries which are likely to occur, does the number of providers in the scheme 
make any difference in the revenue distribution of private providers.  The charges for 
deliveries and probability distribution of risk cases remain same.  We run the simulation 
model using the @RISK software with (n*100) iterations and 1000 simulations, each time 
using a different random seed value (see Appendix 1 for a discussion on this part of 
modelling).  Here “n” is the total number of service providers at a particular district, so the 
probability that a particular service provider will be preferred by a beneficiary is 1/n 
(assuming each provider has equal chance of being preferred). The total number of iterations 
required to obtain a cost figures for a package of 100 patients is (n*100). 
 
The distributions are based on number of iterations to get 100 clients at a particular service 
provider.  Since the arrival of maternal delivery cases is a discrete event, we fit discrete 
distributions to simulated data (i.e., number of patients arriving at the service provider).  
These results suggest that for each of the district, number of patients arriving at a particular 
service unit is following either Negative Binomial or Poisson distribution. Average number 
of patients arriving at a particular service station is 100 for each of the districts.  
 
Since the number of observations (iterations or number of patients arriving for delivery) is 
very large, and probability of selection of a service provider is very small, so number of 
clients arriving at a particular service unit in any of five districts is assumed to follow a 
normal distribution with mean number of patients arriving being 100.   This inference is 
verified with values of skewness and kurtosis, which are very close to 0 and 3 respectively 
thus showing the normal behavior of number of patients arriving at a particular service 
provider. This helps us to fulfil the assumption of doing simulation for 100 cases.   
Given the uncertainty in flow of delivery cases, the simulation results also suggest that 
provider is exposed to some risk of not getting 100 cases all the time.  For example, the 
distribution statistics given in Table 8 indicates that the provider may get 69 cases on 
minimum side.  The minimum and maximum values have been arrived at after assessing the 
probability of getting delivery cases. Theoretically, there is possibility of getting no case at all.  
Similarly, there is possibility of getting large number of cases, but given the number of 
providers, the maximum number of cases can go up to 138.  
So on the basis of these values, it can be inferred that at any point of time minimum number 
of patients that a service provider in a district can expect varies between 65 and 75.  Similarly, 
maximum number of patients that a service provider can expect may vary between 120 and 
140 (all the other assumptions remaining same).  But most of the time, the difference 
between maximum number of patients and minimum number of patients visiting a service 
provider can be 33, as suggested by the last row of distribution statistics Table 8.  This row 
gives that there is a probability of less than or equal to 0.1 that the difference between the 
maximum number of patients and minimum number of patients visiting the service provider 
will be more than 33 while average, modal and median values will be 100.  This gives an idea 
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provider. The simulation results of cost distributions are discussed below (see Figures 3.1-
3.5).  
The simulation results of Scenario 2 (see Table 9) suggest that the presence of number of 
providers is not having any significant impact on the revenue distribution of providers and 
their average revenue ranges between Rs. 1414 and Rs. 1423.  Thus, the simulation results 
suggest that in all the cases average revenue earned by a provider in the absence of joining 
the Chiranjeevi Yojana is less than the government decided reimbursement package. The 
probability of earning revenue more than government offered reimbursement package for 
any provider is however smaller than the probability of earning revenue less than this value 
(see Table 10). Last column of that Table 10 shows that under both scenarios, if the private 
service provider is a part of the scheme, he will be earning a marginal extra profit per case 
however small as compared to the cases where the provider is not a part of the scheme. 
In addition, in no case did the maximum revenue exceed Rs. 1622 at 95 per cent confidence 
level (see Table 9).  However, theoretical value of the maximum revenue is extrapolated as 
infinity, yet the practical values based on simulated data suggest that the maximum revenue 
possible is less than Rs. 1920.  
The risk characteristics of the revenue distribution also remain same as discussed in Scenario 
1.   As can be seen, the distributions for all the districts are right skewed, that is, costs are 
having an inclination towards the higher side, but a greater than 3 kurtosis value suggesting 
denser concentration of revenues around mode.  This scheme also reduces the inconsistence 
in the revenue generation pattern for the service provider by ensuring a marginal profit per 
case, irrespective of the nature of the delivery case. Consequently, government scheme is 
attractive for the provider.  
IX.  Summary and conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to understand whether the private provider has an incentive 
to join the Chiranjeevi Scheme.  We use the methodology of Monte Carlo Simulation to answer 
this question.   We examine the distribution of revenue of a private provider using same 
probabilities of risk cases in maternal delivery and charges for various procedures as assumed 
in the Chiranjeevi Scheme.  The results suggest that if a provider does not join the 
Chiranjeevi Scheme, distribution of revenue per delivery of providers for each of the districts 
under study is significantly scattered. This reflects the situation when the service provider is 
outside the scheme and faces the entire distribution of different types of cases over the 100 
patients. For example, from the results section, it is evident that under Scenario 1, the 
average revenue per delivery of a service provider who is not a service provider of the 
scheme, is Rs. 1416 and it is less than Rs. 1445 ((Rs. 1795 less Rs. 350 towards 
reimbursement for food, transport and Dai) that is reimbursed by the Chiranjeevi scheme.  
The results further suggest that distribution of the revenue is scattered asymmetrically 
indicating significant risk in revenues to provider.  As compared, the Chiranjeevi Scheme 
provides a fixed amount of Rs.1445 for each of the 100 cases irrespective of the status of the 
cost. Therefore, by joining the Chiranjeevi Scheme the provider is able to reduce the overall 
risk in revenue.  In addition, the increased volume will spread the fixed cost of the provider 
and increase overall profitability further. The provider, in the absence of this scheme, may 
maximise the revenue by doing more caesarean cases.  The scheme has embedded incentive 
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benefits from health systems point of view.  Thus, we can conclude that the private provider 
has an incentive to join the scheme as it helps the provider to reduce overall risk, spread its 
fixed costs to larger volume, improve its profitability and stabilize its revenues.  This is 
contrary to the view expressed by some providers in these districts that the scheme is not 
financially profitable to them.  The providers use this argument to charge more money from 
users of their facilities.  The government should take a clear view on this and discourage 
providers from charging additional amount from BPL users. We also argue that a batch size 
of 100 deliveries will produce these benefits to the provider.  The scheme also provides 
incentives to providers to join the scheme and reduce their per-unit costs.   When we 
simulate the results with the number of providers contracted out in each district the results 
do not change significantly.  Since the provider under the scheme is paid up-front advance, 
there is no transaction cost of bureaucratic delays in payments.  Given the incentives in the 
scheme, the government should negotiate the quality standards of care and institute 
mechanisms to monitor this. 
There are other questions requiring further analysis.  First, the scheme contracts out private 
providers for 100 deliveries.  Given the utilisation of institutional facilities for deliveries and 
probability of delivery status (normal, caesarean and other complications), is the batch size of 
100 deliveries an optimum size from provider viewpoint?  Optimality need to be measured in 
terms of (a) ability to break-even based on the financial package for 100 deliveries as set by 
the government, and (b) ability to break-even based on the stated/experienced costs of 
provider in that region.  Second, the number of providers contracted out has implications for 
the distribution of cases across providers.  Given the population of the district and the 
number of deliveries that are likely to occur, what is the optimal number of providers that 
should be contracted out for delivery services?  The results of the present study suggest that 
if probabilities of risk cases remain uniform across providers and each provider has same 
probability of receiving delivery case, there is no problem.  However, it is very unlikely that 
distribution of risk cases remains uniform across providers and households may have some 
preferences in selecting a provider.  In addition, if number of providers is going to be large 
what should be the spatial distribution of these providers?  Third, the distribution of risk 
cases may not get distributed as per the assumed probabilities.  What are the implications of 
asymmetric distribution of risk cases of deliveries among providers? Given the distribution 
of cases among providers, is there a need for intervention at any stage to reduce the 
asymmetry in risk cases across the providers?  At what level should this intervention be 
done?  Fourth, this scheme has implications from viewpoint of the users.  Given the out-of-
pocket costs of delivery at the hand of private providers, what are the implications for a 
family incurring these costs in the absence of Chiranjeevi Yojana and descending in below 
poverty levels?  Delivery status has significant implications for expenditures and affects the 
households in economic terms.  This would have implications for income available 
particularly for households below the poverty line.  The delivery related expenditures include 
both delivery and health related expenditures (normal and complicated) and other expenses 
in case of extreme negative outcomes resulting in death of mother and/or child (i.e., how 
many months of income spent on such expenses?).   Most of these expenditures would be 
indispensable to the household.  We need to examine the effect of delivery-related costs in 
absence of the Chiranjeevi Yojana, on reduction in the maximum income, as defined for 
BPL households.  In the absence of Chiranjeevi Yojna, poorer people will be forced to either 
undergo private procedures with out-of-pocket costs of delivery, thereby forcing these 
families more towards economically poorer condition or take resort to home deliveries 
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Table 1: Financial Package for Chiranjeevi Yojana 
Procedure  Cases per  
100 deliveries 
Cost (Rs.) 
 Per procedure 
 
Total (Rs.) 
Normal Delivery  85  800  68000 
Complicated Cases 
Eclampsia/Forceps/ Vacuum/ Breech  3  1000  3000 
Septicemia 2  3000  6000 
Blood Transfusion  3  1000  3000 
Caesarean 7  5000  35000 
Pre delivery visit  100  100  10000 
Other Costs 
Investigation 100  50  5000 
Sonography 30  150  4500 
NICU Support  10  1000  10000 
Food 100  100  10000 
Dai 100  50  5000 
Transport 100  200  20000 
Total  100   179500 
Source: Presentation given by Health Commissioner of Gujarat, Dr. Amarjit Singh in the IIM-A campus, 
March 2006 (in complicated cases Episiotomy has also been taken into account and cost per procedure is 
Rs. 800; Eclampsia is different from Forceps/Vacuum/Breech delivery, since cost per procedure is same 
has been clubbed together) 
Table 2: Performance indicators from November 2005 to February 2006 







Banaskantha 5945 50  58 90%  5%  5% 
Dahod 6750  18  15  79%  4%  17% 
Kutch   3912  47  21  74%  5%  21% 
Panchmahals 10450  29  29  95% 3%  2% 
Sabarkantha 4584 73  10 89%  10% 1% 
Total 31641  217  133  87%  5%  8% 
Source: Ramesh Bhat, Amarjit Singh, Sunil Maheshwari and Somen Saha (2006). Maternal Health 











IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
Page No. 16 W.P.  No.  2007-01-01 
Table 3 : Assignment of probabilities to various procedures as used in simulation 
Details %  of 
cases 
# of cases Probability  Source of 
information 
Cases sent back or shifted to wards  0 0 0  Local hospital 
Normal case after primary evaluation 70 70 0.7  Local  hospital 
Sonography after primary evaluation  30 30 0.3  Local hospital 
Normal after Sonography  20 20 0.67   
Total normal cases  90 90   Chiranjeevi 
Complicated after sonography  10 10 0.33  Same 
Case is ready for labour  76 76 0.84  Local hospital 
No, shift to ward  14 14 0.16  Local hospital 
Total to labour room  90 90    
Normal delivery  85 85 0.95   
Forceps and vacuum  3 3 0.03   
Total Normal   88 88 0.98  Chiranjeevi 
Cesarian from normal  2 2 0.02   
Cesarian from Sonography  5 5 0.5   
Total caesarean  7 7   Chiranjeevi 
Blood transfusion  3 3 0.3  Chiranjeevi 
Scepticemia 2 2 0.2  Chiranjeevi 
Total # of cases  100 100    
Any complication in mother  0 0 0   
NICU 10 10 0.1  Chiranjeevi 
Direct to ward  100 100 1  Local hospital 
Cesarian investigation  7 7 1  Chiranjeevi 
Blood in-house + Cesarian   0 0 0  Chiranjeevi 
Blood outsourced + Cesarian  0 0 0  Chiranjeevi 
Mother’s complication ( Blood transfusion )  0 0 0  Chiranjeevi 
Mother’s complication ( Septicemia )  0 0 0  Chiranjeevi 
Mother’s complication ( Eclampsia, others )  0 0 0  Chiranjeevi 
 
Table 4: Service rates at various stations 
Services  Average service rate Service time  units 
Clinical Investigation (15)  96 15  min 
Normal investigation  48 30  min 
Ward 4 360  min 
Sonography 96 15  min 
Cesarian investigation  32 45  min 
Blood In-house + cesarian investigation  24 60  min 
Blood outsourced + cesarian investigation 16 90  min 
Normal/Forcep 2.4 600  min 
Sce 24 60  min 
NICU 24 60  min 
Mother complication  16 90  min 
Ward after observation  0.5 2880  min 
Ward after complication  0.2 7200  min 
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Table 5: Revenue assumptions used in simulation for Scenario 1 and 2 
 Service station  Cost (Rs.) 
Clinical Investigation  0 
Normal investigation  150 
Sonography 150 
Cesarian investigation  150 
Blood requirement  1000 
Ward   0 
Normal delivery  800 
Forceps / vacuum  1000 
Observation 0 
Cesarian   5000 
NICU 1000 
Mother complication  5000 
Ward stay  0 
Ward stay after cesarian  0 
Septicemia 3000 
Eclampsia & others  1000 
Food, Dai, Transport  350 
 
Table 6: Providers and Deliveries 
Districts Total  O&G 
in the district 
Enrolled in 
Chiranjeevi Yojana 
Number of Deliveries 
Banaskantha 50  58*  32% 5945  19%
Dahod 18  15  11%  6750  21%
Kutch 47  21  12%  3912  12%
Panchmahals 29  29  17% 10450  33%
Sabarkantha 73  10  28%  4584  14%
Total 217  133  100%  31641  100%




Table 7: Distribution statistics of revenue distribution of service 
provider not joining the Chiranjeevi Yojana under Scenario 1 
Minimum (Rs.)  699 (1089) 
Maximum (Rs.)  +Infinity (1869) 
Mean (Rs.)  1416 
Mode (Rs.)  1399 
Median (Rs.)  1410 
Standard Deviation (Rs.)  112 
Skewness 0.31 
Kurtosis 3.15 
Left X (p = 5%)  1242 
Right X (p = 95%)  1609 
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Table 8 : Distribution Statistics of number of patients arriving at the service provider not 
joining the Chiranjeevi Yojana under Scenario 2 
Statistics   Banaskantha Sabarkantha  Dahod Kutch  Panchmahals
Number of Iterations  5000 1600  4700 2900  7300
Number of simulations   1000 1000  1000 1000  1000





Minimum  0 (71) 0 (68)  0 (70) 0 (65)  0 (67)







Mean 100.03 99.89  100.27 100.48  99.98
Mode 100 99  100 100  99
Median 100 100  100 100  100
Std. Dev  10.0015 10.1091  10.0133 10.5927  9.9992
Skewness 0.1 0.1035  0.0999 0.1164  0.1
Kurtosis 3.01 3.0112  3.01 3.0159  3.01
Left X (p = 5%)  84 84  84 83  84
Right X (p = 95%)  117 117  117 118  117
Diff. X (p = 90%)  33 33  33 35  33
 
Table 9: District wise revenue distributions statistics of revenue distribution of the service 
provider not joining the Chiranjeevi Yojana under Scenario 2 
Statistics Banaskantha  Sabarkantha Dahod Kutch  Panchmahals
Functions  Beta General  Gamma  Beta general Pearson type 3  Log Normal
Minimum  1016 (1146)  740 (1109) 735 (1108) 344 (1078)  440 (1122)
Maximum  2087 (1832)  +Infinity (1810) 2796 (1809) +Infinity (1920)  +Infinity (1870)
Mean  1414 1417 1421 1418  1423
Mode  1398 1399 1411 1393  1404
Median  1409 1411 1418 1409  1416
Std. Dev  114 109 111 116  112
Skewness  0.22 0.32 0.16 0.44  0.34
Kurtosis  2.81 3.15 2.96 3.37  3.21
Left X (5%)  1235 1248 1243 1241  1250
Right X (95%)  1609 1605 1608 1622  1617
Diff. X (90%)  374 356 366 381  367
 
Table 10: Comparative study of the revenue more than 1445 and less than 1445 
  
Chance that the 
average cost will 
exceed 1445 















Provider 0.38  1346.11 98.89 1530.74 85.74  13.15
Banaskantha 0.38  1343.16 101.84 1529.40 84.40  17.44
Dahod 0.40  1350.19 94.81 1531.06 86.06  8.75
Kutch 0.38  1344.57 100.43 1534.55 89.55  10.88
Panchmahal 0.40  1351.61 93.39 1533.45 88.45  4.94
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Figure 2 
Revenue distribution of the service provider not  
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Figure 3 
Cost distribution of the service provider not 
joining the Chiranjeevi Yojana under Scenario 2 
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Appendix 1 
Simulation technique 
In simulation technique, we design a model of an actual or theoretical physical system.  We 
execute the model and analyze the execution output. This technique is very helpful in 
situations, which are perishable or too vast or too complicated to study.  It can also be used 
in situations where creating the actual system may not be feasible or it is too expensive.  
Using this methodology, we can create the system artificially, execute it any number of times, 
use various assumptions to examine the impact on the system and examine and study the 
effect of changes on the simulation model of the system. This is also time efficient and cost 
efficient. Greatest disadvantage of this methodology is that in this method, all the inferences 
about the actual system are based upon some artificial copy of the system.  However, if that 
model has been designed with care and has been analysed accurately, it is an effective 
method of analysing any system. 
  
Monte Carlo simulation method 
Monte Carlo (MC) method of simulation is a technique based on the use of random numbers 
and probability statistics to investigate problems. This is a method for iteratively evaluating a 
deterministic model using sets of random numbers as inputs. A simulation can typically 
involve large number of iterations (in thousands or millions) of the model, a task that is only 
practical using computers. Thus, use of Monte Carlo method to model physical problems 
allows us to examine more complex systems than we otherwise can. In addition, use of 
random numbers eliminates any chance of subjective judgment on the part of investigator. 
Thus with Monte Carlo technique, a large system can be designed using random numbers, 
and that data can be used to describe the system as a whole.  
Random seed value  
The seed is a number that initializes the selection of numbers by a random number 
generator. Given the same seed, a random number generator will generate the same series of 
random numbers each time a simulation is run. So it is suggested to use different seed values 
during different simulations, so that random nature of the simulation technique can be 
maintained.  
 
Simulation software @Risk 
In the simulation when a beneficiary reaches the facility her characteristics at each station is 
decided using risk-discrete function with the construct in @RISK as follows: 
Riskdiscrete ({outcome 1, outcome 2… outcome n}, {p1, p2… pn}) 
If a particular beneficiary is having a certain characteristic of delivery case, then it will pass 
through those processes only and corresponding costs will occur for that patient. For this 
purpose, nested “If-Then-Else” structure has been used.  For example, if a beneficiary 
arrives, it will be checked in OPD (Clinical investigation) as described in the flowchart, to 
determine  whether this is a low risk delivery case, or high risk case or whether sonography is 
required or there is still time and the beneficiary is required to wait or still there is time and 
she is sent back.  For this purpose, function used is 
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Here, 0 indicates there is still time, come later, 1 indicates low risk case, no sonography 
required, that is normal delivery case and 2 indicates high risk case, sonography is required.  
As per the cost matrix, at this stage, cost is zero for all beneficiaries.  Then a value is assigned 
to the beneficiary using simulation.  For example, if this beneficiary is assigned a value 2, she 
becomes a high risk case, and sonography will be required. Now this patient will reach to 
Sonography station. Here the function used will be RiskDiscrete ({0, 1}, {0.83, 0.17}), 
where 0 indicates normal delivery case and 1 indicates Caesarean, here probabilities have 
been used using the above mentioned probability matrix.  At this stage the cost of this 
process is Rs.150 as provided in cost matrix.  Once this beneficiary is assigned value 1, it is a 
caesarean case. So it will be sent to caesarean investigation section. There function used is 
RiskDiscrete ({0, 1, 2}, {p0, p1, p2}), where 0 indicates blood transfusion is not required, 1 
indicates blood transfusion is required and in-house blood is available and 2 indicates blood 
transfusion is required and in-house blood is to be outsourced.  If the beneficiary is assigned 
a value 0, then cost is Rs.150, else cost is Rs.1150 using function IF 
(AT11=0,150,150+1000).  In case the beneficiary is assigned the value 0 which indicates 
that blood transfusion is not required and only routine investigation will happen.  After this 
she will be shifted to operation theatre for which the cost is Rs.5000.  After operation, the 
mother and the child will be kept for observation for 1 hour.  For this there is no cost 
assigned.  During this observation mother and child can experience two states: (i) no post 
operation complications, or (ii) post operation complications. This is assigned to patient 
using function RiskDiscrete ({0, 1}, {0.95, 0.05}), where 0 indicates no complication and 1 
indicates post-operation complication.  No-complication outcome does not have any costs as 
the mother and child will be sent to ward for 3 to 5 days stay since this case is a caesarean 
case.  The ward stay duration in case of a normal delivery is on the average 2 days.  
In case there are post-operation complications, child might have two states, NICU or no 
NICU again using RiskDiscrete function. In case of NICU the cost is Rs. 1000 else it is 
zero.  At the end of simulation a case all these costs will be added to obtain the total cost for 
the beneficiary.  We add fixed cost of Food, Dai and Transport to obtain the final total cost.   
Using @RISK we run the simulation model with 100 iterations and 5000 simulations, each 
time using a different random seed value.  Here 100 iterations denote 100 patients and the 
whole system of 100 patients are simulated 5000 times, thus giving us distribution of average 
costs. 
 